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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jodie Marie Edwards appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional
guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). On appeal she
argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Prior to the hearing on Edwards' motion to suppress, the parties entered into the
following stipulation of facts:
On July 4, 2013 at approximately 9:00 p.m., Sheriff's Deputy Alex
Hughes stopped a white, 1992 Chevrolet pickup truck being driven on
Highway 41, in Bonner County, Idaho. The basis of the stop was an
equipment violation, to wit: the truck did not have any mud flaps, in
violation of Idaho Code §49-949. The driver, and sole occupant, was
identified as Jodie Marie Edwards, also known as Jodie Marie Dill, the
defendant herein.
The deputy advised Edwards/Dill of the basis for the stop and
lawfully retrieved her driver's license. The return from dispatch revealed
that Dill had an outstanding and extradictable [sic] arrest warrant. Deputy
Hughes removed Edwards/Dill from the vehicle and placed her under
arrest and Mirandized her. Sheriff's Deputy Penn lawfully conducted an
inventory search of the vehicle for impound purposes and during the
search located 24.5 grams of Methamphetamine in 3 different locations, a
small amount of Marijuana, and a Methamphetamine pipe.
The pickup truck in this matter is equipped with a body and it is a
motor vehicle eight thousand (8,000) pounds gross weight or less which is
designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property.
The pickup truck in this matter did not have any mudflaps or splash
aprons behind the rear wheels.
The lowest point of the pickup bed behind the rear wheels is in [sic]
20 inches or more from the ground.
(R., pp.97-98.)
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The state charged Edwards with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine). (R., pp.78-79.) Edwards moved to suppress the evidence against
her, arguing it was the fruit of an unlawful detention. (R., pp.87-88.) Specifically, she
argued the mud flaps on her vehicle complied with the requirements of I.C. § 49-949
and, therefore, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her.

(R., pp.99-108.)

After a hearing, the district court denied Edwards' motion. (R., pp.109-116.) Edwards
entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to challenge the denial of her
motion to suppress.

(R., pp.121-136; 12/17/13 Tr., pp.4-10.)

The district court

accepted Edwards' guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction, from which
Edwards timely appealed. (R., pp.175-182, 206-208, 212-214.)
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ISSUE
Edwards states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Edwards' motion to suppress
evidence because her truck was in compliance with I.C. § 49-949?
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Edwards failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress?

3

ARGUMENT
Edwards Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Edwards challenges the denial of her motion to suppress, arguing as she did

below that "her truck was exempted from the 'mud flap' requirement contained in I.C. §
49-949(1 )(a)," because (1) "her truck had a factory built bumper" in accordance with I.C.
§ 49-949(1)(c), and (2) her "truck's bumper and fenders were capable of arresting and
deflecting dirt, mud, water, and other substances" as required by I.C. § 49-949(2)(b).
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4, 6-7.)
In regard to her first argument, Edwards is "[m]indful of the fact that the plain
language of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c) does not apply to trucks", but she nevertheless contends
"her factory built bumper exempts her truck from the requirements of I.C. § 49949(1 )(a)." (Appellant's Brief, p.7; see I.C. § 49-949(1)(c).) Edwards' second argument
similarly concedes, "[r]egardless of whether I.C. § 49-949(2)(b)[1l exempts vehicles from
the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1) or whether I.C. § 49-949(2)(b) adds requirements
to those contained [in] § 49-949(1 ), [she] did not submit any evidence to support her
theory that her vehicle's fenders and bumper were capable of arresting and deflecting

1

Idaho Code § 49-949(2)(b) states:
(2) Fenders or covers, as used in subsection (1) of this section, shall be
deemed to be of sufficient size and construction as to comply with those
requirements if constructed as follows:

(b) The fender or cover is constructed as to be capable at all
times of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other
substance as may be picked up and carried by wheels[.]

4

dirt, mud, water, or other substances[,]" and "[m]indful of this evidentiary shortcoming,
[she] still argues that § 49-949(2)(b) exempts her truck from the requirements of§ 49949(1 )(a) .... " (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) Based on these two arguments that her
truck complied with I.C. § 49-949, Edwards contends Officer Hughes did not have
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of her truck and detain her. (Appellant's
Brief, p.6.)
Edwards' arguments fail.

The district court correctly applied the law to the

undisputed facts in concluding the mud flaps on Edwards' pickup truck did not comply
with the width and height requirements of I.C. § 49-949 and, therefore, the stop was
lawful. Edwards has failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the

trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews
the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,
302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over
which the appellate court exercises free review.

State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796,

798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying Edwards'
Motion To Suppress
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and

implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2006)
5

(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure
must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).
However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are
permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person
has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.
Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210.

Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146

"An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate

possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is
being driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981 )).

"Reasonable suspicion requires less

than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the officer."
State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citation
omitted). Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on
the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,203 P.3d at 1210; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980,983, 88
P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
Deputy Hughes stopped Edwards because her pickup truck did not have any
mud flaps as required by I.C. § 49-949.

(R., pp.97-98.) Interpreting that statute, the

district court first found that the language of I.C. § 49-949(1)(a) requires all trucks,
including Edwards' pickup truck, to "have covers or mud flaps as wide as the tire width
and not more than 10 inches from the ground."

(R., p.114.)

Conversely, the court

concluded that "[s]ubsection 1(c) of the statute is unambiguous in its application to
'every motor vehicle other than trucks,' and therefore, has no application to the case
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involving a truck."

(Id. (emphasis added).)

Because the evidence presented at the

suppression hearing established that the mud flaps on Edwards' vehicle did not extend
to 10 inches above the surface of the highway, the court upheld the stop as being
justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Edwards violated I.C. § 49-949. (R.,
pp.114-115.)
The district court additionally found that, because Edwards failed to provide any
legal support for her argument that I.C. § 49-949(2)(b) (re: fenders/covers capable at all
times of arresting and deflecting dirt, etc.) supersedes subsection (1) of that statute, the
court could not find that her pickup truck complied with the statute "simply because it
was equipped with fenders." (R., p.114.) As acknowledged by Edwards on appeal, she
"did not submit any evidence to support her theory that her vehicle's fenders and
bumper" met the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(2)(b), even assuming that subsection
superseded subsection (1 )(b) of that statute. (See Appellant's Brief, p.8.)
Edwards does not challenge any of the district court's factual findings. Nor does
she seriously argue that the district court erred in its interpretation of the law. Instead,
she merely reiterates the arguments that were made to and rejected by the district
court, while "[m]indful of the fact that the plain language of I.C. § 49-949(1)(c) does not
apply to trucks," and "[m]indful" of the evidentiary shortcoming relative to I.C. § 49949(2)(b). (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Edwards' arguments fail for all of the reasons set
forth in the district court's well-written and well-reasoned Memorandum Decision And
Order re: Defendant's Motion To Suppress, which the state adopts as its argument on
appeal. (R., pp.109-116 (attached hereto as Appendix A).)
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered upon
Edwards'

conditional

guilty

plea

to

possession

of

a

controlled

substance

(methamphetamine).
DATED this 4th day of February, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of February, 2015, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed
to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRIC+OF-~S'JA-'IE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
JODIE MARIE DILL aka
JODIE MARIE EDWARDS,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CR-2013-0003324
CR-2013-0003524
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER re: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Because the defendant's vehicle is a pickup truck by definition and failed
to meet the requirements ofldaho Code§ 49-949(1)(a), the officer had reasonable
articulable suspicion to make the stop and the stop was lawful. Therefore, the
motion to suppress is denied.

TIIlS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, which was filed
on September 20, 2013. Defendant Jodie Marie Dill, aka Jodie Marie Edwards, is represented by
Bonner County Public Defender Janet K. Whitney. The State of Idaho is represented by Bonner
County Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Shane Greenbank.

I. FACTS 1
On July 4, 2013, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Sheriff's Deputy Alex Hughes stopped a
white 1992 Chevrolet pickup truck being driven on Highway 41, in Bonner County, Idaho. The

1 The prosecution and defense stipulated to these facts on November 5, 2013. See Stipulations for Hearing on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress (filed on November 5, 2013).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
re: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 1
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basis of the stop was an equipment violation, to-wit: the truck did not have any mud flaps, in
violation of Idaho Code § 49-949. The driver, and sole occupant, was identified as Jodie Marie
Dill, also known as Jodie Marie Edwards, the defendant herein.
The deputy advised Dill of the basis for the stop and lawfully retrieved her driver's
license. The return from Dispatch revealed that Dill had an outstanding and extraditable arrest
warrant.

Deputy Hughes removed Dill from the vehicle and placed her under arrest and

Mirandized her. Sheriff's Deputy Penn lawfully conducted an inventory search of the vehicle for
impound purposes and during the search located 24.5 grams of Methamphetamine in three
different locations, a small amount of Marijuana, and a Methamphetamine pipe.
Dill's pickup truck is equipped with a body and is a motor vehicle of 8,000 pounds gross
weight or less, which is designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of
property. The pickup truck did not have any mud flaps or splash aprons behind the rear wheels.
The lowest point of the pickup bed behind the rear wheels is 20 inches or more from the ground.
II. ISSUE PRESENTED

In her Motion to Suppress, Dill raises the following issue:
A. Did Dill's vehicle violate Idaho Code § 49-949, and if not, did Deputy Hughes lack

reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop?
Dill argues that her vehicle did not violate Idaho Code§ 49-949, because her pickup truck
had fenders or covers that were constructed as to be capable at all times of arresting and
deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances that may be picked up and carried by wheels, in
compliance with Idaho Code § 49-949(2). Further, her vehicle is a Ford pickup truck that has a
factory built bumper fastened directly to the :frame of the vehicle pursuant to factory installation
requirements, bringing it into compliance with subsection (1) of the statute.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
re: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 2
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Dill contends,

-

-

therefore, that Hughes did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop her for a violation
of Idaho Code § 49-949. Dill requests that all evidence found as a result of the stop and
subsequent search of her vehicle be suppressed, because the search violated her rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

ID. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 275 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012), the Idaho
Court of Appeals set forth the standard of review for a motion to suppress:

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we freely review the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v.
Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees,
140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306,309 (2004). At a suppression hearing, the power
to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence,
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. ValdezMolina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132
Idaho 786,789,979 P.2d 659,662 (Ct.App.1999).

Id at 778, 275 P.3d at 4. (Emphasis supplied).

IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Defendant's Vehicle Was Required to Comply with Idaho Code§ 49-949(1)(a).

Idaho Code § 49-949, which sets forth the requirement as to fenders or covers over all
wheels on motor vehicles, provides:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or move or any owner to permit
to be operated or moved, any motor vehicle, truck, bus, semitrailer or trailer, upon
any highway without having the vehicle equipped with fenders or covers which
may include flaps or splash aprons, over and to the rear of wheels, as follows:

(a) On the rear wheels of every truck equipped with a body, bus, trailer or
semitrailer the fenders or covers shall extend in full width from a point above and
forward of the center of the tires over and to the rear of the wheels to a point that

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
re: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 3
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is not more than ten (10) inches above the surface of the highway when the
vehicle is empty;
(b) Behind the rear wheels of every truck not equipped with a body the fenders
or covers shall extend downward in full width from a point not lower than

halfway between the center of the wheels and the top of the tires on the wheels to
a point that is not more than ten (10) inches above the surface of the highway
when the vehicle is empty;
(c) Behind all wheels of every motor vehicle other than trucks, buses,
semitrailers, or trailers, the fenders or covers shall extend in full width from a
point above and forward of the center of the tire over and to the rear of the wheel
to a point that is not more than twenty (20) inches above the surface of the
highway, unless the bumper is a factory built bumper fastened directly to the
frame of the vehicle pursuant to factory installation requirements;
(d) Fenders or covers are not required on any modified American-made pre-1935
vehicle, or any identifiable vintage or replica thereof that is titled as a later
assembled vehicle or replica and is used for show and pleasure use when such
vehicle is used and driven only during fair weather on well-maintained hardsurfaced roads.
(2) Fenders or covers, as used in subsection (1) of this section, shall be deemed to
be of sufficient size and construction as to comply with those requirements if
constructed as follows:

(a) When measured on the cross sections of the tread of the wheel or on the
combined cross sections of the treads of multiple wheels, the fender or cover
extends at least to each side of the width of the tire or of the combined width of
the multiple tires, as the case may be;
(b) The fender or cover is constructed as to be capable at all times of arresting and

deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substance as may be picked up and carried by
wheels;
(c) For school buses if the body extension behind the rear wheels exceeds five (5)
feet
LC. § 49-949. (Emphasis supplied).
Idaho Code § 49-949 sets out four categories of vehicles to which its requirements apply:
(1) trucks equipped with a body, (2) trucks not equipped with a body, (3) every motor vehicle

other than trucks, and (4) any modified American-made pre-1935 vehicle, or any identifiable
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
re: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 4
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vintage or replica thereof. Dill argues that her truck should fall under subsection (l)(c) of the
statute, which she contends excludes from violation of the statute vehicles with factory built
bumpers fastened directly to the frame of the vehicle pursuant to factory installation
requirements. Dill's argument, however, ignores the plain language of subsection (l)(c) which
excepts trucks from that subsection.
The Court finds that the language of Idaho Code § 49-949 is unambiguous. Subsection
(l)(a) of the statute applies to pickup trucks; subsection (l)(c) does not.

Subsection (l)(c)

expressly states that it applies to "every motor vehicle other than trucks ... " J.C. § 49-949(c).
"Truck" is defined in Idaho Code§ 49-121(10), as follows:
"Truck" means:
(a) Refuse/sanitation. Any vehicle designed and used solely for the purpose of
transporting refuse.
(b) General. Every motor vehicle exceeding eight thousand (8,000) pounds gross
weight designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property.
(c) Pickup truck. Every motor vehicle eight thousand (8,000) pounds gross
weight or less which is designed, used or maintained primarily for the
transportation of property.

(d) Truck camper. A portable unit constructed to provide temporary living
quarters for recreational, travel or camping use, consisting of a roof, floor, and
sides, designed to be loaded onto and unloaded from the bed of a pickup truck,
and containing at least one (1) of the following facilities: stove; refrigerator or
icebox; self-contained toilet; heater or air conditioner; potable water supply
including a faucet and sink; separate 110-125 volt electrical power supply; or LPgas supply. Truck campers originally constructed with an overall length of six (6)
feet or longer shall be titled as provided in chapter 5 of this title 49. A truck
camper does not include pickup hoods, shells or canopies.
(e) Truck tractor. Every motor vehicle designed and used primarily for drawing
other vehicles but not so constructed as to carry a load other than a part of the
weight of the vehicle and load so drawn.

I.C. § 49-121(10). (Emphasis supplied).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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Dill's vehicle is a pickup truck by definition, and was equipped with a body. Thus, it must
meet the requirements ofldaho Code§ 49-949(l)(a) and must have covers or mud flaps as wide
as the tire width and not more than 10 inches from the ground. Subsection (l)(c) of the statute is
unambiguous in its application to "every motor vehicle other than trucks," and therefore, has no
application to this case involving a truck.
Additionally, Dill argues that her vehicle did not violate Idaho Code§ 49-949 because her
pickup truck was equipped with fenders that were "constructed as to be capable at all times of
arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances that may be picked up and carried
by wheels," in compliance with Idaho Code § 49-949(2)(b). Dill asserts that "Idaho Code § 49949(2) sets out specifications that would render the fenders [or] covers in compliance with
subsection (l)." Brief in Support ofDefendant's Motion to Suppress (November 5, 2013), at 10.
Apparently, the defense is arguing that if a vehicle has any type of fenders or covers, it is in
compliance with the statute. The defense has, however, presented no legal authority showing
that subsection (2) of the statute supersedes subsection (1). Therefore, this Court will not make a
finding that Dill's vehicle complied with Idaho Code § 49-949 simply because it was equipped
with fenders.

B. Deputy Hughes Possessed Reasonable Articulable Suspicion For The Stop.
In State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 294 P.3d 1121 (2013), the Idaho Supreme Court
stated:
Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Benage,
143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007). Limited investigatory detentions
are permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). "Reasonable suspicion
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
re: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 6
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must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that
can be drawn from those facts." Id. Reasonable suspicion requires more than a
mere hunch or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Id (quoting United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)).
The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at or before the time of the stop. Id.

Id at---, 294 P.3d at 1124. (Emphasis supplied).

Upon consideration of Hughes' sworn statements regarding the stop in his Probable
Cause Affidavit, filed on July 5, 2013, together with the briefs of the parties, this Court finds,
based on the totality of circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop, that
Hughes had reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop. Therefore, the stop was lawful.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

NOW, TIIEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED t h i s ~ day ofNovember, 2013.

Barbara Buchanan
District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby cert;ify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid,
or delivered, this _l_ day ofNovember, 2013, to:

Shane Greenbank:
Bonner County Deputy Prosecutor
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Courthouse Mail

Janet K.. Whitney
Bonner County Public Defender
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Courthouse Mail

Deputy Clerk
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